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The emerging field of sociolinguistics is a response to numerous roadblocks encountered in
the more specific area of linguistics. One of the more important of these roadblocks occurred in
attempts to provide a linguistic explanation of bilingualism through interpreting languages in
contact in terms of an interference perspective. Such a perspective emphasizes structural aspects
of languages as explanations of changes in either (or any) language within the contact situation.
The language contact situation, however, made extremely evident that explanations of language
use must include social factors. In the case of bilingualism, the more general sociolinguistic
perspective emphasizes inter-relations between language use and socially constructed situations at
the micro level. At the micro level, language forms can be viewed as tools with which social
meanings are constructed and communicated, each utterance thereby containing an information
aspect (which is obvious) and a more general social aspect. At the macro level, language forms
become markers of the relations between and among complex social groups and, in this sense,
reflect the more purely sociological concerns of class and stratification. The upshot of this new
perspective is that all utterances come to be viewed as tools and containers of social meaning
regardless of whether those utterances come from one recognized language or from six recognized
languages; people use their sounds to discriminate meaning and will accomplish that
discrimination with whatever system they have at hand. Hence, through a sociolinguistic
perspective, bilingualism becomes but a special case of this process.
The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate some relationships between language forms and social structure in such a
way that the former may be used in understanding the latter. The core assertions in this discussion are two: (1) That language
forms are tools with which social structure is made sensible to members, and through which it is constantly re-created by
members; and (2) that those language forms can be made sensible to the observer and used as indices of that created social
structure.
In the course of developing these two assertions, the organization of this discussion will reflect two highly related
changes in assumptions in the field of language concerns: (1) The assumption that recognized languages are inviolable rule
systems from which all speech forms are derived has been altered to account for rules governing those speech forms labeled
"creole," "dialect," and "style;" and, (2) The assumption that competence in a language can be isolated from the ability to
perform through speech (Chomsky, 1965) has been altered in an attempt to integrate language use and ability with its social
contexts. Both of these assumptions were brought to bear upon the earlier studies of bilingualism and both came to be
questioned as the social contexts of bilingualism became increasingly important in explaining that phenomenon. The changes
in these assumptions laid the groundwork for a sociology of language. This discussion will begin with those earlier studies in
bilingualism, will then trace some of the conflicts that arose, and finally will outline a perspective integrating the results of
those conflicts with the social contexts of speaking.
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Language Interference
If a single theoretical issue can be isolated in the field of linguistics as the gadfly responsible for bringing language
concerns under the rubric of sociological and anthropological perspectives, it would have to be the problem of understanding
bilingualism. The "pure" language studies based on one informant speaking in a laboratory were derived from the assumption
that there was a one-to-one correspondence between culture and language. One culture with one language requires a sample of
only one person. This assumption was absolutely unworkable in a bilingual situation, however, due to the blatant variety in
language forms encountered. Nevertheless, while linguists involved with bilingual studies came to the realization that language
varied with and was often dependent upon social organization, their research was built upon the basic langue-parole
distinction of deSaussure, and th is, to a large extent, determined the kinds of results they obtained.
DeSaussure's distinction concerns the basic structure or rule system (langue) of language on the one hand, and the
ability of any individual to speak it (parole) on the other. The point of this distinction is that language is an internally
coherent body of rules for communication and, as such a body, should be conceptually abstracted from actual forms of
communication. The assumption continues that "speakers" of a language are those who possess an understanding of and an
ability to manipulate that body of rules in response to any particular situation requiring communication. The importance of
this assumption, then, is that any given act of communication in any situation can be viewed as a logical (although sometimes
incorrect) derivative of the rule system, this conclusion thus leaving the researcher justified in studying the latter without
getting his hands dirty.
Extending this assumption to the study of bilingualism, the researcher is then confronted with two or more such "rule
systems" being used concomitantly by the same individuals as the basis for their individual acts of communication. The
question that arises is to what extent do those individual acts of communication maintain a separation between the two rule
systems and to what extent do they combine aspects of both rule systems through producing sentences which have no single
basis in either language? The former case is called "pure bilingualism" and the latter case is called "interference." Research
along this theoretical continuum has been the basis for almost all "Iinguistic" efforts in bilingualism and, until recently, has
been viewed as an end in itself (LePage, 1969: 142-3). Nevertheless, whether against its will or not, the perspective of
interference has become a means to other ends, and for this reason, it seems valid to take a closer look at its development.
The modern classic work in interference is Uriel Weinreich's Languages in Contact, first published in 1953. He defines
interference as "the rearrangement of patterns that result from the introduction of foreign elements into the more highly
structured domains of language, such as the bulk of the phonemic system, a large part of the morphology and syntax, and
some areas of the vocabulary" (Weinreich, 1953: 1). Interference is "the rearrangement of patterns" and clearly refers to
language as a rule system. As Weinreich points outs, the notion of interference assumes that every speech event belongs to a
specific language (Weinreich, 1953: 7). With this as a starting point, Weinreich proceeds to subdivide the rule system of
language and makes an effort to isolate and explain every aspect of interference that might occur within each subdivision. But
before following the story of interference any further, it might be well to take a quick glance at the last page of the narrative
and note that a later linguist, Nils Hasselmo, defines interference (in part) as "the simultaneous application of the patterns of
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two languages to the same item" (Hasselmo, 1969: 123). The "patterns" of Weinreich have become the "application of the
patterns" for Hasselmo, and the study of interference is clearly going to confront DeSaussure's "parole" before it's through.
Returning to the breakdown of language for the purpose of isolating interference, probably the basic starting point
would be the morpheme. The morpheme is the smallest unit which communicates grammatical relations-a definition which
includes the communication of meaning (Liles, 1972: 142). It accomplishes this in part through systematically following
phonological rules. This suggests that any study of interference would have to be concerned with both the morphemic and
the phonemic aspects of language, and this is precisely the position of Einar Haugen (1956). Weinreich chose to divide the
morphemic analysis into two categories-grammatical relations and lexicon (Weinreich, 1953). Such a distinction (although
redundant for Haugen) is of particular utility for sociological concerns in that it permits a separate analysis of language's
designative function as it structures the environment into a sensible realm for the speaker.
Viewing the phonemic aspects of language from an interference perspective has replaced the common sense notion of
mispronunciation. Sounds that come from speakers are usually as systematically "i ncorrect" as they are "correct." In a
bilingual situation, the fundamental question becomes one of contrasting available phonemes in both languages. The problem
for the speaker of reproducing a sound he hears in another language or even hearing the sound in the first place may be
largely determined by the sounds he is accustomed to discriminating and reproducing. Beyond this, the aet of learning a
"second" language's phonemes (to whatever degree) may in turn influence the phonemes he uses in his "first" language. Of all
reflexive types of interference (from language two to language one), there is generally the least amount at the phonemic level
and, as follows, the "accent" is usually the last to go in learning the second language. Rayfield (1970) suggests that this is due
to the stage of life when learned; that the random sounds of a child become shaped into the standard phonemic forms of the
language in his environment well before he produces words or sentences in that language. In addition, the "sounds" of a
Ianguage are far less conscious to the speaker than are words or grammar.
For the bilingual individual, the experience is one of maintaining two sets of sounds with those respective languages. As
is commonly the case, the two sets of sounds wi II have some degree of overlap when pronounced "correctly" and
understandably may come to have more overlap depending upon an individual's confrontations with the languages in the
contact situation, Such phonemic interference then becomes a rather effective marker of the form and degree of those
confrontations for the speaker's audience.
At the level of grammatical relations occur those rules concerning sequence, agreement, intonation, dependence, and so
on. All aspects of grammar are basic to communication and, like phonemes, can become altered in the contact situation. Once
again, grammatical relations can be borrowed directly into a language or can have the indirect effect of altering the structure
and/or meaning of those forms originally common to that language (Weinreich, 1953: 30). According to Weinreich, this sort
of interference will be directly related to the structural independence of the grammatical form, the more independent, the
more easily borrowed (Weinreich, 1953: 36). It is also informative of the borrowing language. When a verb, for instance, is
borrowed but is conjugated in one of several alternative forms of the borrowing language, that form selected suggests
something about perceptions of rules or regularities among the speakers concerning their own grammar. In short, the level of
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grammatical relations of a language is subject to a unique form of interference, but like the phonemic level, it also marks the
language (and, of course, social) confrontations of the speakers.
According to Weinreich's notion of structural independence of morphemes, the lexicon of a language is clearly the
most open to borrowing and, at least in terms of absolute frequency, this is the case. The relationship between the lexicon
and the other structural levels of language leads to particular kinds of lexical interference. The two possibilities of either
outright borrowing from language two or redefining already existing structures in language one that have run throughout the
whole discussion of interference more clearly illustrate the relation of language to social meaning and point out the
limitations of a purely interference orientation insofar as it ignores the social dimension of speech.
The borrowing of single object words is one of the most common forms of lexical interference. In Colorado Spanish,
for instance, the words "troca" (truck) and "torque" (turkey) have been clearly borrowed and spelled in Spanish in such a
way as to most closely approximate the English pronunciation (Weinreich, 1953: 48). An example of redefining existing
structures occurs in the same dialect with the Spanish word "ministro" (cabinet official, in Spanish) which has come to refer
to Protestant ministers as well (Weinreich, 1953: 48). The sounds of new words are also a factor in redefinition, as the
Portuguese word "pinchar" (to jump) has come to mean "to pinch" in American dialects of Portuguese (Weinreich, 1953:
49). In addition, there are induced creations such as the German word "Wolkenkratzer" (cloud scratcher literally) based on
the English word "skvscraper ," and hybrid creations, such as the Florida Spanish "home plato" (home plate, in baseball)
using "home" from English and "plato" from Spanish (Haugen, 1958: 783; Weinreich, 1953: 52). It should be obvious that
there is an interplay between all structural levels of language and the social dimension of meaning, but perhaps this point can
be made through one additional example.
In American Italian exists the borrowed word "giobba" based on the English word "job" constructed in a similar
manner to the "torque" example above. It was assumed that perhaps this new word was simply a synonym for arte, mestiere,
professione, impiego, or occupazione, all of which have some bearing in Standard Italian to employment. In checking out this
assumption, however, it was found that Italian Americans who used the word defined as "work that is found and for which
one has no attachment and no spiritual interest" (Weinreich, 1953: 54). They stated further that only in America was such a
word necessary and that there were no Italian words which captured the meaning. Accepting this definition, the two closest
Italian words, "impiego" (employment) and "Iavoro" (work), became somewhat restricted in their meaning as giobba took
over some of their possible applications. The point, of course, is that words are learned and, in the bilingual situation,
borrowed in terms of a social context. The importance of this borrowing is therefore of direct relevance not only in terms of
pure language interests or as indicators of social structure, but also in terms of how individuals come to perceive their social
environment and their relation to it. Giobba was clearly learned and associated with a significant feature of the Italian
experience in this country.
Language Dominance and Semantic Structure
To further set the stage for both the changing assumptions in linguistics and for the increasing relevance of linguistic
concerns for sociology, it would be useful to look at some of the research concerning bilingualism, semantic structure, and
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verba\ ab\\'tv. ,his research has largely been the domain of social psychology and has had nUnlCI"OUS reper cussions on
language pol icy, particularly with regard to education.
Weinreich (1953: 9-10) attempted to account for dual language learning and semantic structure through the following
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schematic processes:
Diagram (A) depicts an initial confrontation with a new language. It is assumed that within language one, the signified
(idea/word) and the signifier (sound which represents it) are combined as one unit. Language two is then learned insofar as its
signifiers can be organized with those units in language one. Diagram (B) represents a more "fluent" situation, but one in
which there is an equality (or direct translation potential) between both signifieds and signifiers. An individual represented by
this scheme would have access to two languages as rule systems of communication but would be operating with essentially
one semantic structure with which both rule systems were connected. Diagram (C) describes a "pure bilingual" operating with
two rule systems, each with its own system of semantic meaning. This individual could be very fluent in both languages, but
would also view them as completely different activities in terms of how they structured the world. As follows, this individual
would also be a very poor translator as he would be lacking any means for forming equivalences between the languages.
While Weinreich mentioned this in passing, these ideas were formalized and more elegantly packaged by Ervin and
Osgood (1954) with their compound - co-ordinate distinction. Compound bilingualism is essentially diagram (8) and
co-ordinate bilingualism is essentially diagram (C). They conceived of their concepts as ideal types located on either ends of a
continuum and as representing the variety of mental sets that a bilingual might possess. By and large, it would be difficult to
notice the difference between the two through speech except that a compound bilingual would be far more vulnerable to
interference since his distinction between the languages was more at the conscious level as two sets of rules learned as
requiring separation in use. More importantly, however, Ervin and Osgood maintained that the true test was that of
translation. A compound bilingual would have little trouble whereas a co-ordinate bilingual would have to go through all
manner of machinations and could still not match the compound. Translation, Ervin and Osgood suggest, is learned like
anything else, and the experience of a co-ordinate bilingual in translation activities would soon turn him into a compound
bilingual. While this information on bilingualism could be important in itself to someone hiring translators, the more
significant aspect for sociology concerns the social contexts within which varying forms of bilingualism arise. As pointed out
by Macnamara (1967), the co-ordinate bilingual exists because he acquired his languages in different social contexts. As with
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an individual word such as giobba, so also are languages subject to their contexts, and parallel social contexts (if one can
create such a metaphorical abstraction) would result in parallel semantic systems, each semantic system tied tightly to
whatever language was used in its context (see Haugen, 1965).
A further derivative of the inviolable language assumption is the theory of language dominance. The theory of
dominance assumes that since languages are separate systems, one of them is going to be the more (or most) dominant. An
extension of this is termed the balance effect and it describes language acquisition and use as a zero-sum game in which the
greater ability an individual has with one language, the lesser ability he will have in any other (Macnamara, 1966: 15-16). This
theory goes on to state that the more two languages are structurally dissimilar, the more difficulty the bilingual individual will
have with both. The basic assumption behind this theory, outside of assuming that languages are fixed systems, seems to be a
time factor. An individual spends only so much time in language-related activities, and the more time he spends in one
language, the less time he will spend using another. Although it is freely admitted that such an assumption is only really valid
in reference to lexicon (as opposed to grammatical structure, for instance, which constantly repeats itself in use), this
perspective has directed numerous studies into bilingual ability and has had a fundamental effect upon compulsory
monolingualism in education.
In measurement, the balance theory is reflected in a number of tests designed to determine degree of bilingualism.
Following a structural breakdown of language into semantics, syntax, lexicon and phonemes (or graphemes, if reading),
language ability is measured across another dimension consisting of speaking, writing, listening and reading (Macnamara,
1969: 81). Of the many language tests, those most closely associated with the balance theory focus on time (as a measure of
fluency) and ambiguity (as a measure of dominance) (Macnamara, 1967: 62-64; 1969: 86-89). The time focus assumes that
quickness in all the language structural and use categories mentioned above effectively measures fluency. The time
assumption is, however, clearly an assumption and mayor may not have any relation to the subjects being tested who may
respond quite differently to time restrictions than a white middle-class researcher accustomed to a more stop-watched
existence (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 557). The ambiguity focus assumes that a bilingual speaker presented with a word
which could be pronounced and/or interpreted in either of two languages will select that language which is dominant. This
latter measure requires, of course, two relatively similar languages. In Spanish and English, for example, "debate," "social,"
and "control" are spelled the same and mean roughly the same things but are pronounced distinctively differently.
These kinds of tests coupled with assumptions about language balance have been much used with other measures of
social class and intelligence in the educational field. Carrow (1957) found that San Antonio, Texas Chicanos who were
supposedly bilingual spoke neither language "well" and simultaneously scored lower on nearly every language test when
matched for age, social-economic status and non-verbal 10 measures with Anglo mono-linguals. Peal and Lambert (1962)
found exactly the opposite with bilingual French-Canadians who consistently outmatched their monolingual counterparts in
language ability tests (see Macnamara [1966] for a thorough review of this research). Other research exists with findings at
every point in between the above two extremes, suggesting that the balance theory is not the best explanation for bilingual vs.
monolingual language ability. This kind of research can, however, be of use to the sociologist for the very different end of
identifying social contexts of language use.
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The beginning assumption concerning language ability measurement based on two dimensions, structure and media,
provides a useful index for the observer of where language was learned, how it was learned, and how it is used on a day-to-day
basis. An individual will not necessarily encounter reading, writing, listening, and speaking experience in a language in the
same contexts. It is common, for instance, for an immigrant to a second language culture to master a listening ability, develop
a workable speaking ability, and have no ability whatsoever in reading and writing. Conversely, a second language learned
through an educational setting would foster a good reading and writing ability coupled with either an underdeveloped or
overly formal speaking ability (Sawyer, 1971: 381). Beyond these relatively extreme examples, even most educated
monolingual speakers in any culture will have definite strengths in one or another of the media forms of his language. Few of
us, for instance, are both comfortable and accomplished public speakers, theoretical physics readers, or short story writers.
The media forms of any language with their respective subdivisions provide excellent indices of social experience based on the
social contexts within which those particular forms are emphasized and, more importantly, necessary for the participants to
learn.
Perhaps the real strength of an interference perspective (which focuses on the other dimension mentioned above; that
of the structural components of a language) lies in its merging with the media perspective. Both media forms of a language
and its structural components (grammar, lexicon, etc.) are functions of speaker contact with language situations. The notion
of interference focuses primarily on only the one dimension and only on situations of language contact. Generalizing beyond
situations of clearly recognized language contact and adding the second dimension of media provides a perspective both more
useful in language contact situations as well as allowing a comparison between those situations and others with perhaps only
dialect or style variation across the speech community. In this sense, then, it would be possible to differentiate a speaker's
grammar, lexicon, and pronunciation within each media form, the composite picture being one index of that speaker's
position within a social structure. The assumption here is that the stratification of social structure is essentially a matter of
differential access to resources, power, etc., and that these access routes are marked and maintained symbolically through a
parallel differential access to the symbols. Of these symbols, language use is certainly one of the most important.
At this point in the discussion, there are clearly two major theoretical obstacles in the path. First, there is the question
of how language can be a coherent meaningful marker of social membership. Beyond the question of the speaker's conscious
goals of communicating information, how in addition is it possible for that same utterance to communicate a wide range of
social meaning, both intentional and unintentional on the part of the speaker? The first of these obstacles can be approached
through a discussion of languages as codes with rules of co-occurrence (the following two sections), and the second through a
discussion of the socially defined language domain (the final section).
Languages as Codes
A code is the process of converting meaning into signs and back into meaning according to rules. The conversion into
signs is encoding and the conversion back into meaning is decoding. Both of these processes are directed by the rule system of
the code so that, by knowing and following the rules, any individual can note the signs encoded by another and decode them
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back into more or less the original meaning. This definition is designed to be very general so that it might apply to the
colorful waving of flags from the masts of ships as well as all normal use of any language among its speakers. Since, of course,
language is the subject of this discussion, it might seem that the more general perspective of code is somewhat unnecessary;
that it is one more attempt on the part of social scientists to remove their discourse from the realms of others. But this is not
the intent here. The focus on all speech as code forms will not only result in a great economy of words but will also permit a
much easier introduction of language concerns into the framework of sociological interpretation. The role of the code
perspective in this theoretical relocation will be to initially call into question certain assumptions about language and its
relation to other social processes.
Re-interpretations are usually applied to past assumptions and conclusions before they begin breaking new ground.
Following in this tradition, a return to language interference with code perspective in hand results in a picture of the bilingual
as one engaged in code-switching between one rule system and another without overlap (Hasselmo, 1969: 123). To the
extent, then, that an individual switches in accordance with the phonological and morphological rules of each system, he may
be said to be a "pure" bilingual. But once again, the assumption of the inviolable rule system is confronted. Consider, for
example, the following quotation:
Once the local code is established, any divergence from it in the samples of speech of a bilingual as a result of the
other language may be analyzed as a case of bilingual interference. (Mackey, 1965: 241 )
In emphasizing both "Iocal" and "code," Mackey is clearly aware that languages (Iike all codes) are arbitrary. He maintains
that all notions of language must be empirically determined, and if the only way of expressing something in the local code is
through a "borrowed" word (such as "bouquet" in English), then that word shall be considered to be part of the local code,
no matter how recent the borrowing. One might well ask Mackey how he then knows when "the local code is established"?
But he has already been "asked":
There is no such thing as a language except insofar as the verbal habits of two or more people overlap. It may
therefore be misleading from the outset to speak of interference in the case of bilingua's possessing two sets of
norms; interference occurs precisely because and to the extent that people are not bilingual and do not possess
two sets of norms (LePage, 1969: 144).
Responses such as LePage's, directed to the shortcomings of the interference perspective are the result of his (and others')
experiences in the field wherein assumptions regarding languages as separate and internally coherent systems quite simply do
not work (see also Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 561-3).
One of the advantages of the code perspective is that it is far more open to being whittled down, when necessary, into
sub-categories within recognized languages. This point is summed up very strictly by John Gumperz:
Rather than characterizing members as speaking particular languages it seems reasonable to speak of speech
behavior in human groups as describable in terms of a linguistic repertoire consisting of a series of functionally
related codes. Depending on the history of such communities, these codes may be dialects, styles, or superposed
varieties of the same language or also genetically distinct languages. There is evidence to show that in such
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repertoires the same social determinants may be operative in situations of stylistic and bilingual selection. In
other words, rules determining alternation between distinct languages or dialects may serve the same
communicative ends as the selection of optional rules with a singlelanguage. These selection rules are not simply
a matter of conscious choice. They operate in response to communicative contexts much like the grammatical
choice, between, for example, present and past tense verb forms (Gumperz, 1972: 145) [my emphasis].
If it is possible to be even more succinct, one might add that whenever you find a social structure, you will also find people
talking within it. The ways in which they label their talking mayor may not be important, depending upon the questions
with which the observer concerns himself. In any attempt to explain that social structure and language's symbolic importance
within it, bilingualism is only a special case of that relation (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972: 38-9; Hymes, 1967: 9).
The concept of code is clearly moving in the direction of finding roots in the social environment of communication. In
generalizing to account for the social ramifications of speech variation, a socially significant style shift by a monolingual
speaker also becomes a significant code shift. The importance of this, as Labov (1972) has pointed out, is that there are no
single style speakers. Hence, code-switching is a fundamental aspect of all communication. The "Iinguistic repertoire" of a
speaker, as mentioned by Gumperz, may encompass a number of "different" languages in response to a communicative
situation, or it may include only one recognized language. In the latter case, whatever communication distinctions might be
made through language switching can be made just as clearly through code-switching within that language. In both cases, the
form of communication is tailored to the social environment and reflects the structured variation of situations within that
environment. Hence, previous distinctions among the concepts of language, dialect, creole, pidgen, argot (from deviant to
respectable group forms), and style tend to soften somewhat as all these communication forms become viewed as codes
susceptible to being switched into and out of. This "nest" of terms (which reflects that assumption about language mentioned
earlier) also becomes less important as a group in that switching style to style, style (in one language) to dialect (in another),
or language to language all are manifestations of code-switching of potentially equal importance. For example, a Chicano in
the United States who switches between "pachuco" (a youth gang-oriented argot with elements of Spanish and English) and
some variety of English is every bit as important from a code-switching perspective as a Chicano who switches between
Standard Spanish and Standard English (Barker, 1950; 1947). The former case represents argot to dialect switching (perhaps)
while the latter is clearly language to language switching. The former Chicano would likely be young, live in a big city barrio
(probably in the Southwest), and more than likely be lacking both money and power, while the latter Chicano would just as
likely be a member of one of the 1I0 id families" of the Southwest and have a relatively high social position in Anglo society
coupled with a great deal of pride in the Spanish heritage (Barker, 1947; Christian and Christian, 1966). It is possible to know
quite a bit about these two Chicanos as their two social positions present different linguistic repertoires to them, but as
repertoires, both have considerable code variability within them and allow the speakers the same significant distinctions
through code choice.
The code perspective sheds a new and critical light on theories of language dominance and balance as well as
interference (Gumperz, 1967: 50). The assumption that a bilingual will always be at a linguistic disadvantage makes little
sense if all monolinguals face similar problems of learning elaborate code variation within their one language. In this sense, a
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bilingual can be viewed as an individual who has spread this same variation across at least two recognized languages. And it is
here that the focus of the language assumption sharpens. A bilingual switches codes in response to his relation to the social
structure. It is therefore understandable that he would not have the same perspective on code switching within either of his
two languages that a monolingual speaker of one or the other might have. For example, a Belgian businessman who speaks
French at the office and Flemish in his home would not have the same code variation within French as a French businessman
who needs to make the same distinctions within one language. On a language test, then, the Belgian would not appear to have
the same "ability" with French as the monolingual, the Belgian's "errors" in that language forming in the vacuum left when
he normally switches completely outside the language. He would be lacking, therefore, what might be termed an "intimate
style" in French. One of Macnamara's (1967) Flexibility Tests includes phrases of the type, "he is drunk," with the request
that the subject come up with as many different ways of saying the same thing as he can think of. Not only would such
knowledge vary within anyone language depending upon anyone individual's socializing proclivities, it would also be
knowledge that, in the case of the Beligian businessman, would co-occur with a switch to Flemish. Hence, he would do poorly
on this aspect of the French language test (not to mention lacking corresponding knowledge of business activities in Flemish)
and could be taken as a validation of the balance theory. If the same test were limited to those "styles" of French which
correspond to his use of the language, however, he would likely do as well (or conceivably better) than the monolingual, as
Peal and Lambert (1962) found with French Canadian bilinguals. The strength of the code perspective lies in its ability to
illuminate the complex code-switching of the "monolingual" as the basis for assumptions regarding bilingual language ability.
It accomplishes this through focusing on the social environment of all language use and the relation between that
environment and those speech forms associated with it.
The implications outlined above are a response to the social factors which surround speech. An adequate sociology of
language requires an attempt at such an integration. It is therefore not surprising that this turn was taken as concerns
broadened in linguistics. There remains, however, the question of how one might recognize a code if standard
institutionalized definitions of languages are not employed. The argument that a formal grammar approach misses much of
the communicative nature of speech requires, in a sense, a new grammar which accounts for the unity between code forms
and the social settings within which those forms become sensible for speakers. The best basis for such a new grammar would
be the co-occurrence rules of speech wh ich mark those codes.
Rules of Co-occurrence and Interpretation
The search for the co-occurrence rule of speech is a response to the question of how it is possible to tell when someone
is speaking "differently." This difference could consist of either another language or an alternative style. While in the former
case, the listener may sense the difference through an abrupt loss of comprehension, the latter will be highly comprehensible
and, in fact, must be highly comprehensible to him if he is to function at all normally within any social context. Following
Labov's (1972) point that there are no single style speakers, the corollary would be that there are no single style listeners if
our speaker is to be appreciated. Should any individual be incapable of discerning those differences imbedded in his social
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code universe of interlocutors, he would most clearly be labeled a deviant to whatever extent matched his incapability. The
ability to recognize code-switching is the ability to communicate; they are part of the same process. The code employed, its
content, the context within which it is employed, and a share in the assumptive world within which this configuration is
perceived-all of these, as a unit, make up communication. Consider the following example:
A: What is your name?
B: Well, let's say you might have thought you had something from before, but you haven't got it any more.
C: I'm going to call you Dean.
[from Laffal, 1965: 85]
Speaker B not only speaks grammatically, he is also capable of using fairly involved syntax. But he doesn't make sense. He is,
in fact, an individual labeled schizophrenic in conversation with a doctor, and somehow this label allows us to make sense of
his not making sense. Yet we really have little idea of why he doesn't make sense except to say that most people answer that
question differently. This brings up two important questions: Why do most people answer that question differently, and once
they do it, how do we recognize it as being different? Returning to Labov and a more basic question, we then have: How do
people link styles (codes) with social situations and how do they recognize switches among the styles? As suggested above,
the search for rules of co-occurrence is a response to this question.
Co-occurrence is another way of stating the word "pattern," and patterns of one sort or another tend to be the goals of
scientists. This particular pattern is constructed from the total interplay between the structural components of language and
social setting. In a formal sense, co-occurrence refers to the interplay among the structural components only, but as will be
readily apparent, co-occurrence rules extend far beyond that formal structure.
There are two dimensions of language structural co-occurrence-the horizontal and the vertical (Ervin-Tripp, 1971: 38).
Horizontal co-occurrence rules specify "relations between items sequentially in the discourse" (Ervin-Tripp, 1971: 38). This
refers to the same level of language structure. Given a few items drawn from a lexicon, one would not expect to hear certain
other words drawn from the same lexicon. For example,
"Good afternoon, Reverend. Grab yourself a chippendale and take a load off."
somehow does not appear to have come from any situation except humor. One does not tell a Reverend to "grab" something
or to "take a load off," and one usually does not tell anyone to "grab" an expensive piece of furniture. The sentence
alternates between one set of horizontal co-occurrence rules and another. Similarly, a single sentence could violate phonemic
rules or structural rules in its course. Once an utterance selects certain elements from a level of language, it commits itself, in
a sense, to remain consistent at each level. Such co-occurrence, however, is far more useful for interpretation when coupled
with vertical co-occurrence rules.
Vertical co-occurrence refers to predictability across the structural levels of language. The selection of syntax might
also determine lexical items and phonemic rules. Coupled with horizontal rules, that initial selection of syntax, lexical items
and phonemic rules would also affect future choices at each of those levels. Ervin-Tripp's (1971) example illustrates the
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simultaneous breaking of rules across both dimensions:
"How's it going, Your Eminence? Centrifuging okay? Also, have you been analyzin' whatch'unnertook
t'achieve?"
The choice, "How's it going," is casual in style, yet without the more common "goin." In addition, the technical term
"centrifuge" is clearly not matched with "okav," the verb "analyze" would generally receive the more formal pronunciation
in the present participle, and the phrase, "what you undertook to achieve," would generally co-occur with clearer
articulation. In addition, horizontal rules are broken with the interspersing of slang and formal lexical items and with varying
use of ellipsis in the syntax. In short, this utterance is a communicative monstrosity.
A more useful example for purposes of relating co-occurrence rules to the codes they mark is provided by Labov
(1969: 252):
(1) He don't know nothin'.
(2) He doesn't have an inkling of the truth.
Sentence (1) couples the double negative with the "in" ending on "nothing" and simple syntax. It is consistent. Sentence (2)
removes the double negative and this co-occurs with new lexical items, new pronunciation, and different syntax. It also is
consistent. Once again, a violation makes the point stronger. Consider:
(3) He doesn't have no inklin' of de truth.
(4) He don't have no inkling of the truth.
The possibilities are, of course, almost endless. But the basic point is that neither sentence (3) nor (4) would be an expected
utterance except, once again, with humor. Sentences (1) and (2), however, both would be expected as both of them are
internally consistent; whenever "he doesn't have" is heard in English, the listener has definite expectations of just which
forms of utterances may follow and which may not. Similarly, the same listener would have expectations following "he don't
have no," but they would be very different expectations of grammar, lexical choice, and so on. In short, the listener is
capable of recognizing a style (or code) shift through recognizing language forms as patterns and through associating those
patterns with social contexts of speaking. In the particular cases of sentences (1) and (2), which are both clearly English, he
would probably be surprised to hear them coming from the mouth of the same speaker. That surprise would be indicative of
the fact that the listener is not a speaker of Black English, nor does he associate frequently with people accustomed to
switching between Black English and Standard English. If he had never heard Black English, his comprehension might drop as
well, and this code change would approach that of a change to a "foreign language" for him. At the other extreme, if the
listener were accustomed to switching between those codes himself, his perception of the style change would be different
both in degree and in content. He would not be as surprised and simultaneously would assign a different meaning to the
change. Once again, the degree to which a code change is extreme is more a matter of the experience of the communicators
rather than a matter of formal definitions concerning langauges, dialects, or styles.
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An emphasis on co-occurrence rules appears to carry the study of language use some distance from the formal
grammarian. More accurately, however, it extends the boundaries of that endeavor. As John Gumperz points out,
... verbal interaction is always rule-governed, and secondly, ... the rules of verbal interaction go considerably
beyond what we normally understand by grammatical rules. The general linguist who is concerned with grammar
only works at a level of abstraction which covers but part of the verbal communication process. A generative
grammar for English, for example, states the basic rules which underly the verbal performance of such socially
diverse peoples as Midwestern Americans, speakers of Indian English, Australians, Liberians and many more. It
need however not account for what we know to be the many differences in the linguistic performances of these
individuals (Gumperz, 1969: 242).
A sociology of language would clearly go beyond the generative grammarian in its perspectives-this point is certainly not new
to this discussion-but in asserting that all verbal interaction is rule governed and that grammar rules do not extend as
explanations of all verbal interaction, the result is that the concept of co-occurence rules must begin taking its name seriously.
Those rules which are defined at the recognized language level as grammar must be repl icated with the addition of a social
dimension at all code levels. This is particularly difficult in that formal grammar rules do not account for actual speaking
performance in any but the most formal situations. Grammar rules are a part of the rules of co-occurrence in that they
specify one set of those rules for language structure with a formal style (or standard language form). As such, grammar rules
tend to be similar to what Thomas Kuhn (1970) calls a theory of normal science in that grammar rules provide a standard
body of assumptions for explaining language relations and, in so doing, essentially limit alternative assumptions.
Co-occurrence rules provide such an alternative. But any attempt to formalize co-occurrence rules must then start out from
nigh onto scratch with the ultimate goal of working itself up to the level of being able to figure out those rules governing the
kind of but not overly subtle style shifts in this sentence.
Co-occurrence rules draw both their utility and their confusion from their social dimension. A code switch, which is
defined as switching to another set of co-occurrence rules, is only important insofar as the switch is recognizable and socially
meaningful in the situation. The borrowed word, "giobba," which created a problem in the interference perspective, is clearly
an example of a word tied through co-occurrence rules to a social context in that it developed in response to that context.
The example of the reverend "grabbing" a chippendale indicates this further in that men of the cloth and fine furniture can
go together in our assumptions about social structure, while grabbing goes more with a stool or an orange crate coupled with
a lower status guest. In maintaining these distinctions between speech forms and social structure, we mark the contexts of
that structure as significantly "different" or "unique" and concomitantly reconstruct that difference every time we switch
styles.
In her discussion of co-occurrence rules, Ervin-Tripp emphasizes the role of social norms in their maintenance. This
position is in keeping with the social context basis of those rules in that it makes switches in and out of them meaningful to
the participants in those contexts. It nevertheless ignores the fact that co-occurrence rules are nothing more than surface
markers of meaningful speech forms and that first there must be some criteria for the application of that meaning to the
context. A member of the social context must first know how to assign meaning before he can mark that assignation through
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the shared body of coo-occurrence rules. Cicourel (1970) refers to this process of assigning meaning as "interpretive
procedures," arguing that the internalization of norms and the knowledge of when and how to apply them to everyday social
situations are separate (Cicourel, 1970: 139). The norm that states. "one does not tell a reverend to 'take a load off',"
presumes an interpretation of "reverend" and the act of "taking a load off" as both would occur in meaningful social
contexts. That interpretation would then search for an overlap (if any) in the possibility of assigning meaning as a mode of
determining the suitability of applying the norm. If no overlap can be assigned (as in the case of the doctor's interpretation of
the patient's response), some form of a deviant label can (and probably wi II) be invoked. Just as interesting, however, is the
case where considerable overlap is assigned; where the total configuration of co-occurences in speech can be related to the
context:
1
;
A: What is your name?
B: John.
A: Pardon me, but I don't believe I've been introduced to you.
B: I'm John Smith from the credit division.
...
B's interpretation that the second example requires more of a display is the logical result of learning language and social
structure simultaneously. A dictionary and grammatical breakdown of A's questions would only begin to explain the
communication and comprehension of social structure exhibited here. A interprets the context and marks that interpretation
through speech. B re-interprets (decodes) the mark, compares it with his own interpretation of the context, and arrives at an
assignation of meaning which he then marks in his speech forms. Presumably, the cultural phenomenon known as the
"conversation" might then ensue in both cases, but probably very different conversations due to the different definitions of
the situations which both speakers have arrived at and marked in one statement each.
The processes through which we understand speech become very complicated very quickly as we try to understand that
understanding. As Gumperz and Hymes (1972) remark:
The initial observation is quite like that of grammar: We understand sentences rapidly and unreflectingly
in terms of relationships that are not overtly expressed. There must, therefore, be implicit kinds of knowledge in
terms of which this ability can be explained. (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972: 325)
That implicit knowledge is a sharing in the ability to interpret social structure. At least in terms of function, then, this ability
to interpret is not unlike Chomsky's "deep structure" in that it recognizes a common interpretive competence of members in
the social structure. It is, in fact, this interpretive competence that makes them members in the first place; it gives them the
potential for taking the surface markers of speech and weaving those markers into a socially meaningful whole.
An additional example might make this point more clear. The following two sentences are from a
two-year-and-nine-month-old girl's story:
"The baby cried. The mommy picked it up."
Harvey Sacks (1972) wonders why, for instance, we all hear it to be the mommy of the baby that picks it up since there is no
genitive marker (such as "Her mommy ... "). He also wonders why we all hear that sentence two represents an occurrence
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that is explained by a first occurrence represented by sentence one. In short, we all hear a plausible description. Sacks
expands upon this:
We hear that it is the mommy of the baby who picks the baby up because she's the one who ought to pick it up,
and (you might eventually add) if she's the one who ought to pick it up, and it was picked up by somebody who
could be her, then it was her, or was probably her. While it is quite clear that not any two consecutive sentences,
not even any consecutive sentences that report occurrences, are heard, and properly heard, as reporting that the
occurrences ought to occur in that order, and if there is no information to the contrary (such as a phrase at the
beginning of the second, like "before that, however"), then the order of the sentences indicates the order of the
occurrences. And these two sentences do present the order of the occurrences they report in the proper order for
such occurrences. If the baby cried, it ought to have started crying before the mother picked it up, and not after.
Hearing it that way, the second sentence is explained by the first; hearing them as consecutive or with the second
preceding the first, some further explanation is needed, and none being present, we may suppose that it is not
needed. All of the foregoing can be done by many or perhaps any of us without knowing what baby or what
mommy it is that might be being talked of (Sacks, 1972: 330-1).
Besides illustrating how unwieldly such a full description is due to our everyday practice of letting it go unsaid, Sacks is also
illustrating what he calls the "fine power of a culture" which does not "merely fill brains in roughly the same way [but] fills
them so that they are alike in fine detail" (Sacks, 1972: 332). This well entrenched assumptive world remains out of sight
most of the time as it is seldom problematic to the members who share it. It is, however, the means through which they
interpret the world and, for purposes directly at hand, the means through which they make sensible the world of speech and
marked shifts within it.
As we make sense of speech at the level of recognizing descriptions, so also we make sense of subtle style shifts through
common interpretations of co-occurrence rules. Consider the following statements from a somewhat eclectic musician:
(1) I was playln' some country tunes last night.
(2) I was playing Mozart last night.
We all accept the fact that in some significant ways, Mozart is considerably different from country music. We treat the two
music forms differently through a variety of parallel associations. One of these associations is that country music tends
toward the casual while classical music tends toward the formal. Hence, the aet of "playing" the two types is, in fact, two
different acts and the verb is marked accordingly in each case. It could be further argued that the "playin'" of country music
and the "playing" of Mozart are two different words insofar as a word can be defined through the limitation of its
applications. Consider a third example:
(3) I was pickin' some country tunes last night.
With this new verb in the context, we would practically never expect to hear it pronounced "picking" as it always co-occurs
with only certain "types" of music. It could further be argued that "pickin' " and "playin' " in this context are far closer to
being the same verb than "playin' "and "playing" across contexts. This need not be a major issue, however, for as it has been
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defined, a style shift carries a new meaning in itself, and it would seem hardly likely that any lexical items retained would not
be colored in the shift. The shift here occurs with a shift of context and, appropriately, of meaning. Hence, that which we all
know about the difference between classical music and country music is recognized and maintained through style shifts.
Placing our musician back into the classical music context, it is possible to imagine a musically critical neighbor (who
had heard Mozart treated far better) asking the musician just what he thought he was doing. The musician then has at least
two choices for styles. He can choose to be humble through reducing his status through style shift:
(4) Well, I was only tryin' to play Mozart.
The shift is marked by altering the pronunciation of "trying" to "trvin' " (which, among other things, is a status marker), and
through a slight emphasis on "try" and "Mo" which marks a culturally defined "whine:' Or should the musician be a little
more annoyed and assertive to the point that he might wish to challenge the remark of his neighbor, he could respond with:
(5) Well, I was TRYing to play MOzart.
This shift places far more emphasis on "try" and "Mo" (the emphasis will usually co-occur in such a parallel fashion), and this
emphasis co-occurs with a return to the more formal pronunciation of "trying." This overall co-occurrence also co-occurs
with the social dimensions of status and, significantly, the classical music in which our musician is now claiming an ability
through his style shift.
If it is possible to tal k about shared perceptions of co-occurrence rules as markers of style shifting, it should also be
possible to talk about some degree of permanence of codes within a population. Labov (1970) states that it is only possible to
speak of language varieties and alternation when some set of co-occurrence rules has been established. In this sense,
co-occurrence rules become used as a yardstick for measurement, and any reliable measurement tool should not be
fluctuating across time and situations. Having set such a yardstick himself with regard to Black English and Standard English,
Labov then points to a very short explanation provided by a twelve-year-old Negro boy who switched between the two codes
(as measured by co-occurrence rules) eighteen times (Labov, 1970: 35). Labov asks, "Where and how do stylistic meanings
enter into this process?"
The social dimensions of co-occurrence rules have already been outlined, and if this dimension in fact exists, it should
be possible to isolate relations between the social context of speaking and the style of the speech. In his sample of eighteen
code shifts, Labov feels at a loss to find this relation. This brings up the question of language variants as examples either of
code-switching or of free variation. Can it be said on the one hand that a variant represents a significant shift of code, and, on
the other, that the variant is random and has no significance at all? While it would seem that all elements of social context
remained constant during Labov's eighteen shift sample, it is nevertheless possible to imagine a social context which is
essentially incongruous for the speaker (such as one containing an interviewer with a tape recorder) and to which standard
assumptive rules do not apply. A mixed style might well be the result of a mixed speech situation in which immediate
responses to speech forms (as pointed out by Sacks) were in some way interfered with, thus not permitting the flow of
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implicit knowledge upon which speech styles depend. Having mentioned this dependence numerous times, a discussion
focusing on the nature of speech situations is long overdue. This discussion of the second major theoretical obstacle
mentioned earlier will be guided by the concept "domain" (Fishman, 1967, 1971; Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971; Cooper,
1969).
Language Domain
'Proper' usage dictates that only one of the theoretically co-available languages or varieties will be chosen by
particular classes of interlocutors on particular kinds of occasions to discuss particular kinds of topics (F ishman,
Cooper and Ma, 1971 : 583)
In short, there must be a study of speaking that seeks to determine the native system and theory of
speaking; whose aim is to describe the communicative competence that enables a member of the community to
know when to speak and when to remain silent, which code to use, when, where and to whom, etc. (Hymes,
1967: 13).
A theory of speaking (or proper usage) posits a dual knowledge on the part of every speaker-a knowledge of language
and a knowledge of when, where, how, and to whom to use it (Fishman, 1965). It is also assumed that these two forms of
knowledge are in part defined in terms of each other. A knowledge of language would be meaningless unless grounded in
some socially meaningful communication. Similarly, it is difficult to make that communication meaningful without a
knowledge of language. Learning of society and of language occur con-currently, and necessarily so. Hence, it is impossible to
talk about speaking without knowing something about the way in which the situations of speaking have been defined as
situations by the speakers as they learn and use language within them (Gumperz, 1968: 381).
It is in response to this issue that the notions of speech community and speech situation came about. A speech
community refers to those communities which share "both rules for the conduct and interpretation of acts of speech, and
rules for the interpretation of at least one common linguistic code" (Hymes, 1967: 18). One could add, in line with Labov's
(1972) comment on single style speakers, that there will always potentially be more than one common linguistic code in
anything that could be called a speech community. Nevertheless, the definition of speech community does not necessarily
specify a dividing line for determining when one has stepped out of the community. Rules concerning "conduct and
interpretation of acts of speech" are not set in time nor across members of what might seem to clearly be one community.
Similarly, there will likely be at least partial adherence to those rules among those who seem clearly outside the community
and a partial adherence to rules outside the immediate community by those inside. The provision that any group which
exhibits "linguistic peculiarities" may be treated as a speech community (Gumperz, 1968: 381) is only a good working
definition insofar as the members of such a community are seen as having the potential of holding simultaneous membership
in other communities. An occupational association, for instance, might likely exhibit linguistic peculiarities, but in terms of
the social dimensions of that association, other speech styles that the members use in other situations (and their perceptions
of those styles and situations) would certainly be an important factor.
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The notion of situation (which can cut across certain speech communities) refers to "any constellation of statuses and
setting which constrains the interaction that should or may occur... A situation, like a status, is a cultural unit, so that
ethnological study is necessary to determine classes of situations" (Ervin-Tripp, 1971: 50). Hence, a situation, as a cultural
unit, is constructed by the participants through cultural tools. Not surprisingly, therefore, situations are marked by language
forms. As Blom and Gumperz (1972) noted in their study of code-switching in Norway, the language forms that mark
situations are also means for re-marking them, resulting in a new situation. A code-switch, in itself, is enough to instantly
communicate one member's redefinition of the situation, forcing the listeners to discard the previous congruence between
language and social context in their search for a new congruence (if any can be found) with the new language form.
An additional cultural unit is the topic of communication and, like speech community and situation, it is part of the
whole speech context and must be understood in terms of it. Topics are only important in the study of language insofar as
the members perceive themselves to be changing them from time to time. We conceive of ourselves as talking about things
when we talk, and those "things" are often labeled as such. More importantly, we label topics in terms of situations and in
terms of groups of interlocutors. We also distinguish topics through language forms in that we learn about the possibility of
constructing a topic terms of groups of interlocutors. We also distinguish topics th rough language forms in that we learn
about the possibility of constructing a topic through those language forms in context. The more obvious cases of this include
individuals who receive specialized training in a "topic" and are unable to communicate about it in any but the language
forms of that training. We also learn to socially construct our most intimate feelings (a topic) into communications through
language forms, and alternative language forms may well seem wholly inappropriate (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 585). It
can be said, therefore, that a topic is, in part, both defined and understood in terms of the language form through which it is
communicated. Hence, a discussion of woman's rule in the English language presupposes a social context within which both
the role and the language operate, and the "topic" has no direct translation outside of that configuration. In this sense, then,
topic is not so much an explanation of differential use of language forms but rather part of the overall set of co-occurrence
rules among those forms. It is the outcome of assigning meaning to those rules.
The combination of speech community, situation and topic into an overall perspective results in the concept of
"domain." Domain has been defined as "a socio-cultural construct abstracted from topics of communication, relationships
between communicators, and locales of communication, in accord with the institutions of a society and the spheres of
activity of a speech community" (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 587). Domains are simultaneously defined in terms of
societal institutions and the individual process of constructing those institutions in everyday life. Put more traditionally, it is
a concept both of sociology and of social-psychology. As a concept, it recognizes the complexity of the speech act in a social
context through pointing out the internal coherence of all the elements involved in communication. Like all concepts with
noble aspirations, however, it is somewhat difficult to get a handle on, and much of this difficulty stems from the attempts of
the concept to account for the place of role relationships in speech.
Fishman, Cooper and Ma (1971: 570) have tried to describe these role relationships in terms of open and closed
networks. A closed network refers to those role relationships "governed by a single, overriding, fully formed set of
specifications" (Fishman, Coopera and Ma, 1971: 569). An open network is the correspondi n9 ideal type at the other end of
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the continuum in which these specifications are open and fluid. The assumption for language concerns is that the more a role
relationship is specified, the more the language forms utilized will be specified. Since role relations are fundamental to the
concept of domain, the degree to which those relations vary will in large part differentiate domains.
Networks describe or characterize kinds of role-relationships along the dimension of permissible role
fluidity. Individuals who have experienced great danger together, or great intimacy, may permit no other
considerations to govern their future relationships. Individuals who stand poles apart in status, rights, and
obligations may be similarly fixed and unalterable in their relationships. However those who neither partake in a
common, intensive past, nor in a current overriding difference may range over a number of similarities and
differences in the course of a particular encounter without definitely leaving the middle range of
role-relationships. (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 571)
As is clear from the above, however, attempts to differentiate domains in terms of role relationships inevitably encounter
the additional distinction of status.
John Gumperz (1964) has suggested that role relationships be further distinguished in terms of personal and
transactional interactions, referring respectively to the absence or presence of status distinctions. Combining this dimension
with that of network, it then becomes apparent that the two types of closed network mentioned in the above quotation are
respectively personal and transactional interactions within one network and within which there should rarely be much
shifting between interaction types. Conversely, an open network (defined as having no overriding specifications) would be
much more likely to vacillate between interaction types (or along the continuum) as definitions of the situation would be
open for immediate construction. It is in these situations that one would expect to find more rapid code-switching and this
would account, in part, for Labov's dilemma concerning the rapid Black English-Standard English code-switching of the
twelve-year-old boy. The import here is that clear-cut maintenance of language forms depends upon the degree to which their
domains contain closed networks of role relationships. Linguistic repertoires are direct reflections of role repertoires, and
distinct language varieties are dependent upon the degree of role compartmentalization (Fishman, 1967: 32). As that
compartmentalization changes into a more open network, the "situation switching" function of a change in language form
becomes more of a "metaphorical switch" through which the definition of the situation is not assaulted but rather placed in a
temporarily different light for the participants (Blom and Gumperz, 1972: 424-425). If a discrepancy exists as to the
openness of the network among the participants, there will be a corresponding discrepancy concerning the importance of
shift in language form. Such a situation would occur when particular role relationships were in the process of changing (or
fluctuating) between open and closed networks. The importance of language forms as markers is dependent upon the
construction of situations by the participants; hence, an alteration of those constructions also, by definition, alters that which
is marked by language forms and therefore alters the meaning of a shift in those forms.
In order to account for the differentiation of the roles of language forms within a society, Charles Ferguson (1959)
introduced the term "diglossia." Diglossia refers to those instances of bilingualism where two language forms exist side by
side in society, each having distinctly different relations to the social structure. He referred to them as the H ("high") variety
and the L ("Iow") variety, the former being the official, formal, learned from having a basis in the society's major
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institutions, and the latter being the informal, intimate form (often labeled dialect) having a basis in the home. Those
members of the society who interact in both spheres (such as the earlier case of the Belgian businessman) would then have a
facility in both language forms, but only insofar as that form related to its domain of use. It is in this sense that language
forms are said to be functionally related to social structure (Hymes, 1967: 43).
The concept of diglossia assumes a stratified society. While the specification of H as "high" and L as "low" was later
dropped (see Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 566), the implication is clear-that language forms (whether recognized
languages or notldlscrimlnate status distinctions. A "monolingual" stratified society accomplishes the same end through
varieties of its one language. To extend Ferguson's definition, any society that is stratified will be diglossic in the sense of
having differential access to codes and subsequent differential use of them across people and across situations. Returning now
to the personal-transactional distinction made by Gumperz, a personal transaction would take place in some L variety, and a
switch to a transactional interaction would be marked by the use of some H variety. The former carries connotations of
intimacy and the latter carries connotations of status. Adding Fishman's notion of closed vs. open networks of role
relationships, the earlier assertion that closed networks maintain language forms gains support. The more that the domains of
the H and the L variety are separate (through role specification of a closed network), the more each variety becomes
associated with all other characteristics of those domains, and the more intensely each variety strongly carries connotations of
status and intimacy respectively. Each language form then represents an extremely large body of social information, and the
forms will be maintained as long as it is necessary to convey that information. As the domains alter (or overlap), the
information conveyed by the language forms will also change.
Access to the H variety becomes an important variable in describing those groups with little access to the domains of
that variety. In a situation of diglossia, access to a language form which marks status will be restricted in much the same way
as access to the power and resources which accompany that status. An individual with no ability in speaking the H variety will
likely remain at the bottom of the status hierarchy and, conversely, most individuals at that bottom will reflect that inability.
This assertion is derived from the assumption that language forms co-occur with domains, and that an inability to actively
participate in a domain will result in a lack of knowledge in those language forms. Hence, confrontations with the H variety
will occur with transactional interactions in closed networks where the low status individual is given orders in a language form
in which he cannot fight back. Such is the experience of whole groups of individuals who, as groups, are maintained in this
relation to the social structure. The lower in status the group, the more closed its networks, and the more significant the
distinctions in language forms in differentiating domains of intimacy and status.
This point is punctuated by an example drawn from the bilingualism of Chicanos living in the United States. One of the
standard style shifts occurs in Standard Spanish with the disciplining of children. Spanish contains a choice of intimate/polite
in the second person singular (tu/usted) and this choice is reflected in the corresponding conjugation of any verb. A parent
almost always uses the intimate form with his child as, for instance, yen aqui (come here). If, however, the child does not
obey, a style shift may ensue as with an English speaking parent, but whereas English must resort to other means ("Come
here this minute, Thomas Edward Smith III"), Spanish can simply switch all forms to the polite conjugation (vengaaqui) and
convey the same message. With Chicanos living in the United States, however, Gumperz (1972) notes that yen aqui becomes,
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"come here, you," in place of venga aqui, suggesting that in this country, the imperative in English far surpasses any other
possibility in Spanish for getting immediate action. In light of the status positions of English language domains from the
perspective of many Chicanos, it is not surprising that English is the language for commands. Furthermore, considering that
the major English language domain for most Chicano children in the classroom, it is also not surprising that such a style shift
by their parents brings results.
A further extension of the domain perspective sheds some light on problems of bicultural/bilingual education. The
"stilted" and meaningless English language exercises noted by Wax, Wax and Dumont (1964) in the Indian classroom and by
Gumperz (1972) in the Chicano classroom understandably do not work in that they have no relation to within-domain
communication in either culture, not to mention their lack of relation to the student's domains. The result of this activity is
to create a foreign domain to both cultures and to generate sets of meanings and language forms with relevance only to it.
Hence, the old argument that going to school teaches one only how to go to school becomes an even more relevant statement
with regard to the lower status (ilL" speaking) child in what may well be his first encounter with the higher status (H)
language form. As Gumperz (1972) also noted, the same teacher confronted by children who are good speakers of Standard
English immediately relaxes and approaches a normal speaking routine. It is through this "normal" speaking routine that
social structure and language become sensible to the participants. As Susan Philips (1972) concluded from her attempts to
understand the failings of Indian education, the learning of a language does not necessarily include learning the cultural rules
for its use. Borrowing Gumperz's notion of status situated language forms, it could be appended here that those cultural rules
will not be learned unless the learning individual participates in the relevant domains to their use. An individual systematically
denied access to the domains of formal Standard English is, by definition, systematically denied access to those language
forms, and it is doubtful he could acquire them in a simulated domain playpen.
The perspective of a closed network as maintaining these boundaries for status marked language forms has, as
mentioned above, the opposite effect of also maintaining boundary markers for within-group intimacy. The specification of
language forms by status results in alternative bodies of co-occurrence rules which convey information of status to both
outsiders and to insiders (Williams, 1970: 383; Ervin-Tripp, 1971: 39; Blom and Gumperz, 1972: 418-19). Borrowing an idea
from labeling theory, just as language forms (and other markers) allow the "respectable" world to recognize "deviants" in
their midst, so also do those same forms allow those "deviants" to recognize each other. Such recognition permits the
immediate marking of outsiders who are almost, by definition, higher in status and a potential threat. In opposition to some
of the linguistically based cultural deprivation theories (see Bernstein, 1966, 1968; Olim, 1970), some of the greatest
emphasis on skill in the verbal arts has been encountered among poor, inner-city speakers of Black English (Gumperz, 1972:
186). It would seem a sensible assumption that the ability to recognize style variation in language would have some relation
to the social need for possessing that ability.
Should the above status distinctions begin to break down, whether for an individual or for a group, there would be a
significant language shift (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 569). As explained earlier, such an alteration in status distinctions
is a shift from a closed network to an open network. In terms of domains, this would force the previous distinctions among
language forms into a domain overlap. At the recognized language level, Fishman (1971) has traced the acculturation of
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immigrant groups in terms of this overlap. As members of these groups enter into the new dominant culture, the language of
that culture begins to invade the domains of the immigrant language. By the time this dominant language invades the domains
of intimacy (which is usually several generations), the immigrant language has lost its last major domain stronghold and is
likely to disappear from all but the most ritualized activities (Fishman, 1971: 306). This perspective also makes the
co-ordinate-compound bilingual distinction clear in pointing to the con-current shift from the former to the latter as domain
overlap occurs. Co-ordinate bilingualism is maintained through domain segregation, this segregation providing the parallel
meaning systems which characterize it. As the segregation breaks down, the bilingual becomes either a compound bilingual or
(as is more common in the United States), a monolingual. Those languages which have survived in the United States are either
those locked into closed networks of role relationships, such as Spanish or the Indian languages, or those that have
consciously maintained language domains, such as Yiddish (see Fishman, 1966).
Coming full circle, it should be clear at this point just why the Italian-American loan-word giobba does not apply to
employment alternatives in Italy. It should also be clear why several generations of filling " giobbas" in the United States
renders Italian irrelevant for making the immediate environment sensible. The initial interest of linguists in language
interference has placed language concerns firmly in a social context and has brought into question the basic assumptions
which generated the interference perspectives in the first place. While it has not been the sole purpose of this discussion to
illustrate a theoretical patricide, it is nevertheless useful to trace the relationship between the types of questions being asked
about phenomena and the types of assumptions that underlie them. With regard to language concerns, the fields of linguistics
and sociology are beginning to experience a domain overlap, and they may both encounter difficulty in maintaining the
colorful artifacts which have marked their respective cultures.
Appendix
Notes on Methodological Procedures Not Discussed
in the Body of the Paper
I. Linguistic Focus
The possession of a magnetic tape recorder and a willingness to press its "on" button in the most unlikely natural
settings do not insure that the researcher will procure the kind of language data he is looking for. An emphasis on the study
of speech rather than on language (or of performance rather than competence) requires natural speech data, but the
acquisition of this data requires some knowledge of speech at the outset. The question, "Why does anyone say anything?",
must already be in the form of a working hypothesis.
Perhaps the most immediate problem is what Labov calls the "observer's paradox"-"to obtain the data most
important for linguistic theory, we have to observe how people speak when they are not being observed" (Labov, 1972: 113).
As with all forms of field research, so also must the linguist find some way of approaching his subject without overly altering
his behavior. In the case of the one-to-one interview, Labov suggests the use of topic change, thus making use at the outset of
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a dynamic inherent in what he studies. Labov has found that topics relating to (1) death and violence, (2) sex, and the rituals
thereof, and (3) moral indignation, all provide excellent opportunities for the speaker to become involved in his speech to the
point of forgetting (somewhat) the interviewer's presence (Labov, 1972: 114). Another possibility along this line includes
directing the subject to a discussion of language itself, which on the one hand provides justification for using a tape recorder
(particularly if the researcher is "Iearning" a second language), but on the other hand focuses the subject's attention on the
subject of study itself and will certainly result in a more careful speaking style.
In the interview form, perhaps the most difficult subject is the child. Particularly with a fairly young child, the only
practical use of the recorded interview would be with a focus on some form of play activity. In this way, the relationship
between the interviewer and the child would approach some semblance of normality from the child's perspective and might
produce the more natural elicitations so often absent from more formal child-adult interactions. It is interesting to note that
the provision of a reasonable setting for verbal interaction (the assumption of Labov's topic change as well) assumes that
which is the object of a sociological study of language use. Using several types of methodology con-currently is therefore not
only possible, it is also quite preferable.
The use of tasks in the linguistic interview provides a number of speaking styles for interpretation. The above
mentioned "naturalistic" interview is designed to provide samples of casual speech. There are times, however, when the
interviewer may well want samples of a more "careful" speech (whatever that entails in a particular speech community) and
will want to know how to make the subject more aware of his speech. This is conceivably not a great problem. Additional
care in speech style (primarily used for phonological study) can be initiated through asking the subject to read some sample
of discourse and, beyond that, lists of words. In The Social Stratification of English in New York City, Labov utilized these
techniques to isolate particular phonemes which varied regularly across class levels and across speaking styles within class
levels (labov, 1966). Variants of this methodology can, of course, also be used for linguistic structural analysis.
An alternative route to naturalistic speech (particularly useful with children) consists of recording groups of subjects at
the same time. It is hoped here that the presence of a number of people will introduce at least some elements of normal
speech domain as they respond to each other instead of to the interviewer (see 810m and Gumperz, 1972). While it introduces
the possibility of a "group performance" for the benefit of a probably out-group researcher, it nevertheless offers the
potential of individual involvement in communication. This method is, of course, of less utility for phonological analysis due
to technical problems of obtaining audible recordings from all members coupled with the inevitable background noise.
The group membership of the interviewer is, as mentioned above, an important variable. If he is an outsider to the
speech community, his speech will no doubt reflect it. Even an artful interviewer capable of covering this might still be
classed an outsider because of social giveaways through other than language behavior. On the other hand, using a member of
the speech community as an interviewer opens an alternative can of worms through introducing his previous relationship and
subject's perceptions of future relationships with him into the picture. In short, there is a clear advantage to having both
insiders and outsiders in the task (Labov, 1972: 115).
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II. Sociological Focus
The determination of language domains and their elements is in large part a task of participant observation (Cooper,
1969: 196; Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971: 589). Any given speech community will have different physical settings, types of
activities, and perceptions regarding the whole configuration of language related behavior (see earlier discussion). The
observation of this structure as a participant can provide numerous insights as well as avoiding obvious errors in projecting
domain upon a community. In particular, the most significant domains in a community are often conscious topics of
conversation. Informants' statements regarding the people they encounter, where they encounter them, and the nature of
their relationships with them can focus the researcher's attention not only upon well-known community domains and
differential participation in them, but also upon those domains (including the researcher's projections) which could exist but
do not. This latter case might include various forms of voluntary associations which don't exist at all in the community (such
as a nonexistent teacher-parent association) or domains of another speech community "potentially" open to the community
under study (such as non-used welfare office). Particularly in the case of a bilingual/bicultural communtiy, the question of
which domains overlap across cultures and languages and which do not is significant at the outset. The degree of this overlap
and the differences between overlapping and non-overlapping domains for each group are likely to not be readily apparent
and must be determined empirically before they can enter into a more general sociological interpretation as variables.
A method for breaking down the elements of domains consists of analyzing "folk terminology" regarding speech
situations and topics (Ervin-Tripp, 1971: 51-4; Fishman, 1971: 255). As suggested above, domains are conscious in group
interaction. One domain element such as a speech situation may well be waiting pre-packaged for the researcher in the local
lexicon. Examples such as "church service," "hamburger stand," "school yard," and "pool hall" may seem obvious places to
look, but it may turn out there is a significant difference between the "front room of the pool hall" and "the back room of
the pool hall," and these distinctions may be proffered to the researcher through conversation. A similar phenomenon occurs
with topics, such as "we were just tel Iing jokes" as an explanation by the participants of what they were doing. The
perception of topic in conversation is an abstraction from interaction, and a double-checking of these abstractions through
common labels prevents jumping to conclusions in the over-anxious formation of a variable. Once again, however, with regard
to both situations and topics, an important factor will be those that do not exist. To borrow the above example for a slightly
different purpose, the absence of the topic, "the discussion of welfare benefits," among those eligible to receive benefits is
worth noting.
Domains are subject to being validated (and ultimately compared) through other forms of methodology. Fishman,
Cooper and Ma (1971) organized data on language use collected across what they hypothesized to be several language
domains. This included information on which languages were used where, coupled with various measures of language ability.
Many of these measures were not too dissimilar from Macnamara's (1967) Flexibility Tests which are sensitive to domain
differentiation. A subsequent factor analysis of this data resulted in factors which matched the breakdown of domains
obtained earlier by participant observation.
.~
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Other language tests sensitive to sociological variables:
Word Frequency Estimation List: (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971) This test includes lists of words drawn in equal numbers
from various situations which exist in the community. The subject is asked to rate the frequency with which he hears them
(more than once a day; once a month, etc.), The "same" words occur in each list but in different languages. [A version of this
test could be used in a monolingual setting or as an addition to a bilingual setting through breaking down styles within
languages and providing a rough set of synonyms across styles.]
Word Naming: (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971) Related to the above, speech situations are presented with the request that
the subject produce as many words in each language as possible with applications in that situation (kitchen, etc.l, As above
this is bilingual based. Its possible use within one language might consist of differentiating styles from which lexical items are
drawn as a measure of style shifting's relation to situation. Also, as above, this style differentiation could be compared across
two or more languages.
Domain Completion Tasks: (Fishman, Cooper and Ma, 1971) The subject is presented with a few elements of a domain and
is asked to complete it. For example, "You are talking with a school friend about homework. Where are you talking?" and
varieties of this sort ask the subject to make the situation sensible. As a test of domain, two presented elements can be
incongruous ("You are talking with your Priest at the racetrack") in an attempt to find out how the subject would make the
situation manageable. Fishman, Cooper and Ma (19.71) found that incongruous situations were usually filled out with a domain
element from either of the two presented-seldom from a third.
Word Association Tests: (Entwisle, 1968, 1970) Generally designed for children, this test consists of a series of one word
stimuli accompanied with the request that the subject say the first word that comes into his mind. This test is a measure of
language development (as children learn the word classes) and is also simultaneously a measure of the semantic reality of the
child. An example of this latter case might be the stimulus word "sour" for which Entwisle (1970) received "bad" and
"rotten" in the suburbs and "okay" or "still good" in the inner city.
Semantic Differential: (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957; Hymes and Bittle, 1967; Luhman, 1973) The semantic
differential can be used as a measure of concepts' structures as well as empirical validation of basic word classes for a
particular community (see Hymes and Bittle, 1967; and Cole, Gay, Glick and Sharp, 1971).
Homonym Differentiation: (Luhman) Based on the homonyms present in English, most pairs vary in frequency of
occurrence (such as "bear" and "bare"). They also vary as parts of speech. The above pair is a noun/adjective combination
while "hare" and "hair" are both nouns. A story for children composed of such homonyms would act as a measure of
sentence comprehension in that the use of the less common (for children) "bare" would clearly not be the animal to any
---------------------------------------------------------
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child who could recognize adjective placement as a marker of meaning. [This is of particular interest with regard to Spanish
and English where adjectives are placed after the noun and before the noun respectively.J
In addition, personal information that may have bearing upon language use ("Where were you born? What newspapers
do you read? In what languages?" etc.) can be gathered through standard questionnaire techniques, either in the form of an
interview or in a written form (see Fishman, Cooper and Ma [1971] for extensive use of both). In the case of an unknown
bilingual community with unknown rates of illiteracy, the former approach is mandatory. Otherwise, there is the standard
consideration of flexibility vs. quantity respectively.
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